This episode is really timely and cool. It makes all the work we have done up until now worthwhile, and it will make all of the work we do later possible. It surprised the heck out of me when I wrote it for Let’s Get Civil because I put some stuff together that I had not seen before, so it surprised me. That’s why I think it is cool. I hope the audience at least finds it interesting and useful.
It surprised me while writing Let’s Get Civil, because I started the chapter writing about theories of knowledge that evolved into developing a system of universal public moral reasoning. I wrote it like 6 or 7 years ago, and don’t remember how all of it took place. However, when I read the chapter now to re-frame it for this blog, it seems unusual that I did not make a bid deal out of telling readers we were going to develop a system of mature or universal public moral reasoning. It’s a huge achievement within the chapter, so at least for this episode of my blog, I want to make a big deal of it up front. I will leave the work as it was presented in the book because it’s kind of organic, it just develops within the larger discussions of theories of knowledge, but I have put it in the title of this episode and have mentioned it here. Now let’s get to it.
We have been talking a lot about how we think and that that it is important to what we think. Now we are really going to get into how we think.
We have been thinking about different “theories of knowledge” to help us think: Our theory of economics to help us think about economics and economic justice, our theories of cognitive development moral development to help us think about how we learn to reason like grown ups.
Now we might as well start using the technical term that puts thinking about how we think on steroids: Epistemology. Don’t freak out. Words are tools and we have seen that intellectual tools matter. Most words are everyday tools, but some are intellectual tools. “Epistemology” is a very useful intellectual tool. Let me demonstrate that assertion. Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that studies knowledge, what is required to claim we know something. It also studies and develops the organization, structure, and standards of knowledge in a discipline. That’s its classic role and it continues today. We can add that it studies the source of knowledge in various disciplines and their methods. Epistemology lets us really get into how we think.
An Epistemology unites knowledge in its discipline. An epistemology does not "shut itself up in its own standard" or conflicting standards. It unites the standards of knowledge in a discipline which allow it to unite its knowledge.
In this episode, we work on the epistemology of public moral philosophy and the epistemology of social science. Public moral philosophy. Not religious moral philosophy or personal moral philosophy. Public moral philosophy. With that said, we will use the term moral philosophy and we will all know that we are talking about public moral philosophy.
But why epistemology? Because nothing helps us think about how we think as much as learning about different epistemologies. And nothing helps us think about how we think in different disciplines as much as a sound epistemology. Learning about and developing the epistemologies of moral philosophy and social science is indispensable to our full intellectual development, to both how we reason and how we reason morally.
In this discussion, we use what we established from the beginning of the blog: Full intellectual development depends upon both mature cognitive and moral development. We work on the full cognitive and moral development of both moral philosophy and social science by working on their epistemologies.
We're going to study and solve epistemological problems in these two disciplines. We're going to study and do epistemology. To develop an epistemology, we need to identify the sources of knowledge in each discipline as well as the organization, structure, and standards of knowledge in each discipline. This whole discussion is necessary and it holds some very cool surprises.
First, early one, we develop a system of universal public moral reasoning. As we noticed when discussing individualism and universal moral reasoning, individualism works when we exercise freedom which is personal, but we need universal moral reasoning to pursue liberty which is political and is carried out by We the People. We the People must build agreement. We cannot "shut ourselves up in our own standards." We must work together with common standards, shared standards. And developing those shared standards requires a system of mature, universal moral reasoning.
Let me emphasize that. Without a system of mature/universal moral reasoning, we get stuck in individualism. That is why individualism is so prominent in the university, journalism, politics, and the public square; because there is no alternative, there is no system of universal public moral reasoning for We the People to use. It’s a big deal that we develop and can use a system of mature public moral reasoning. It lets use get out of our own, individual standards and develop shared standards of both morals and knowledge. One of the things that surprised me in all of this is how easy it was. We’ll get to it soon.
Second, we develop an epistemology for moral philosophy. We discover that only moral philosophy’s source of knowledge works independently of the social sciences. The organization, structure, standards, and methods of moral philosophy cannot be developed and used in just the work that moral philosophy does. The organization, structure, standards, and methods of moral philosophy have no use, no application without the social sciences. They cannot do anything on their own. They must be used in the social sciences. Moral philosophy can only get its own jobs started. Social science is necessary to get those jobs done. Needless to say, that's an important observation. The organization, structure, standards, and methods of moral philosophy are incomplete without the contributions that only the social sciences can make to them.
Then we turn to the epistemology of social science and discover that it has the same epistemology as is used in science, kind of. We bring moral philosophy into social science's epistemology. So while we maintain a clear distinction between moral philosophy and social science, we also integrate them.
When we have completed our discussion of the epistemologies of moral philosophy and social science, we have integrated them and we have accounted for the source of knowledge in each, their methods, structure, and standards.
We put off the discussion of their organization of knowledge because we will discuss it and paradigms when we turn to Education Justice.
Finally we talk about how natural science, moral philosophy, and social science can work together in the public square and the powerful leadership they can provide to We the People when we work together and when we work with them. That discussion calls for significant cognitive modification as a prerequisite to our behavior modification.
The Epistemology of Moral Philosophy:
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) cleared the air regarding the fundamental difference between inquiry in the natural sciences (natural philosophy) and inquiry in social science (moral philosophy).
In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant taught us that natural science inquires into the nature of what is, into “laws according to which everything does happen.” On the other hand, he wrote, moral philosophy (which, as Kant used the term, is now called social science) inquires into the nature of what ought to be, “laws according to which everything ought to happen.”
The natural sciences are perfectly suited to studying the nature of what is, but they don’t have the tools needed to inquire into what ought to be. What is exists in the physical world and is there to be studied, weighed, measured, observed, calculated, manipulated, and restructured. That’s what scientists do. But that is very different from studying what ought to be which explains why natural science has not developed the tools required to study what ought to be.
Society is a human construct. Humans have created society to meet their needs. By the time humans came along, nature was there to be studied. Humans created society to help them survive and thrive. When humans study what ought to be, we are studying our own creation, and that requires additional tools to what science uses to study nature. As social science has demonstrated, we can use tools from science, but we also must use tools that science does not use.
"What ought to be" does not exist in the physical world. "What ought to be" is a way of thinking about the social world, how we think we should design it, structure it. "What ought to be" tells us what our laws, policies, and programs ought to achieve. "What ought to be" provides us with the standard of knowledge in social science, the criteria for evaluating what is in society, and the criteria for evaluating the efficacy of the laws, policies, and programs we create to maintain and improve society. What ought to be guides our arguments in the public square about laws, policies, and programs that are supposed to make our society become what it ought to be.
So how do we inquire into the nature of What ought to be? We must use tools developed in moral philosophy. We will use two methods of moral reasoning: metaphysical moral reasoning and teleological moral reasoning, and one intellectual tool from moral philosophy, the Golden Mean which we have already used.
Metaphysical moral reasoning is deductive. It starts with a priori assumptions and works toward specific conclusions about what ought to be. We only use it when we discuss women’s reproductive rights and will save our discussion about it until then.
We use teleological moral reasoning extensively. If it is a new term for you, just hang with me a moment. I describe it at length below.
I mention the Golden Mean because it proved essential when I was thinking about economic justice, trying to figure out how we think about it and how we should think about it. Most young readers have probably never heard of it, and many older readers probably remember their most interesting friends disparaging it. Generations of young people have dismissed the Golden Mean, associated it with the Greeks' call for "all things in moderation.” Moderation? You don’t pursue excellence by seeking moderation. You don't do extreme skate boarding by seeking moderation. Fair enough. But as we have seen, it can be a powerful tool in public moral reasoning. It can force us to look for concepts that are not immediately obvious. We had that discussion when we discussed our economic theory and economic justice.
The bulk of our work will employ teleological reasoning. It is easy to make fun of teleological reasoning. Aristotle used it when doing natural science, what was then called natural philosophy. Newton rejected it and replaced with the scientific method, which was a new epistemology. But we must take it seriously when we apply it to moral reasoning. And it turns out to be compatible with the social science method. It does not change the scientific method used by social sciences, it adds to it.
We use teleological reasoning to establish our list of what ought to be in society, what we should do. Statements that describe what we should do are moral statements. We call them our morally grounded purposes. Aristotle called them teloi. Telos is the singular form, teloi, the plural. Teloi rhymes with Malloy. We get teleological reasoning from Aristotle, but we limit it to moral philosophy and the social sciences, and we vastly improve it by applying the power of the social sciences to it.
The Teleological Structure and Standards of Moral Reasoning
Here we go. We are about to develop a system of universal public moral reasoning.
In teleological reasoning, we establish our telos, our goal, our morally grounded purpose, and then we identify the actions that help us achieve our purpose. That's our structure, and it includes our standards. Aristotle called the actions that help achieve one’s telos virtues, and he called the actions that undermine or prevent us from achieving our telos vices.
There you go. Classic moral language. Virtues and vices. We see that the telos provides the standard, the criteria, we use to judge actions as good or bad. We evaluate what we do by asking, Does it help or hurt our attempts to achieve our telos? Aristotle's language of the teleological structure and standards of moral reasoning is easily translated into language that fits public moral reasoning:
Teloi: The morally grounded purposes we establish for our society.
Virtues: Good Laws, programs, and policies that help us achieve our morally grounded purposes.
Vices: Bad laws, programs and policies that prevent us from achieving our morally grounded purposes.
Our morally grounded purposes tell us what we want to achieve, the ultimate goals that We the People seek in the public square. Not in our private lives. In our public lives.
Importantly, we are not talking about being good little girls and boys. We are talking about We the People being able to evaluate laws and public policies. They are good laws and policies if they help us achieve our goals, our morally grounded purposes. They are bad laws and policies if they prevent us from achieving our goals, our morally grounded purposes.
Now notice, moral philosophy can’t identify the laws, policies, and programs that help us achieve our morally grounded purposes or the laws, policies, and programs that prevent us from achieving those morally grounded purposes. Moral philosophy does not have the tools required to do that job. That’s the job of the social sciences. Teleological moral reasoning can’t function, can’t get the whole job done, without the social sciences. That means that our epistemology of moral philosophy must be integrated with social science.
Don’t even be tempted to re-integrate moral philosophy and social science as they were in the High Middle Ages. That would ignore the significant advances social science has made by being scientific.
We achieve that structure and use those standards in both moral philosophy and the social sciences or they don’t exist at all. What we do with “what ought to be” must be done in society, and only the social sciences can conduct the research and development needed to tell us what is in society, how it measures up against our morally grounded purposes, what we can and should do, and what we must not do to achieve our morally grounded purposes.
We improve upon Aristotle’s structure. For one, we’re doing stuff and we’re paying attention to the results. That’s consistent with the scientific method, and in philosophy it's called being pragmatic. That’s what it means to be pragmatic: set a goal, do stuff, and pay attention to results. However, as we have seen, pragmatism has a huge weakness.
Pragmatism is related to analytic philosophy and positivism both of which attempted to fix philosophy by making it scientific. And as we have seen, science does not have the tools required to investigate what ought to be. Similarly, pragmatism reminds us to focus on our goals and on our results, but it does not provide the criteria for selecting our goals, what we ought to achieve. We fix that weakness in pragmatism when we identify our morally grounded purposes, what we ought to achieve.
We’re in the public square and we’re interested in what works and what does not work. But something only works if it does what it ought to do, if it achieves what ought to be. We have put what works in the context of morally grounded purposes. We have united. pragmatism with moral philosophy to establish our criteria regarding what works and what does not work. We have been doing this all along, but now we can name what we’re doing: When we do public moral philosophy, we do Morally Grounded Pragmatism. Not pragmatic morality. Morally Grounded Pragmatism. As we will see, morally grounded pragmatism is wonderfully compatible with the scientific method used by social scientists.
We establish our morally grounded purposes and we use them as criteria (standards) to evaluate what is in society. We’re doing moral philosophy and social science. We have certainly talked a lot about our morally grounded purposes. It's time we find out what they are.
The Morally Grounded Purposes of America’s Democratic Republic:
The American Constitution established the United States as a Constitutional Democratic Republic. It was also founded and has been preserved as a liberal democracy. We have already described the role that John Stuart Mill (1806―1873) played in defining the core principles of the United States and France as liberal democracies.
What are the core principles of our liberal democracy? In identifying our morally grounded purposes, we don’t have to start with a blank slate. This is America. We have had national goals and values since the signing of the Declaration of Independence which stated:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.
Our morally grounded purposes then can start with all humans being created equal and with the unalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. But those are only “among” our unalienable rights. Even before those ends, we must declare our goal of freedom and how we will protect it while making laws.
In justifying the American Revolution, The Declaration of Independence, lists the offenses the King of England committed against the people of the American colonies and ended that list with this assertion:
A Prince, whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.
We’re first of all “a free people. We must start with freedom. Anytime we suggest a law, we suggest that in some manner or other, we will impact someone’s freedom. In this country, we have chosen:
. . . civil freedom of the citizen under a government whose powers are limited, and under a rule of law whose reach is likewise limited, chiefly by the axiom that the constraints of law must serve the cause of essential social freedom.
As we think and talk about creating public laws and policies, we must be able to argue that our laws serve the cause of essential social freedom. Public laws preserve personal and social freedom. Essential social freedom is one of our morally grounded purposes.
We begin with the assumption that all of our citizens enjoy complete social freedom: how they act with others in any social setting: in their home, with their family, what churches and clubs they join, and how they act in those churches and clubs; what they say and write; and so on.
In every facet of their lives, all citizens in a liberal democracy are free. The laws that the government of a liberal democracy makes always impact, reduce in some way, essential social freedom. So even though arguments for laws and policies are intended to clarify and protect our social freedom, they must protect personal and civil freedom. If laws destroy the personal or civil freedom of some of our citizens, telling them that if they don’t like it they can leave the country is not just a stupid statement, it violates a moral axiom of our liberal democracy. It operates in tribal moral reasoning. It violates the rights of some citizens while giving advantages to others. It undermines and threatens our liberal democracy.
Life and liberty are rights that have received considerable attention in the public square. We could treat safety as a separate responsibility, but I think that it's obviously included in “life.” Rather than write life/safety, I will ask the reader to assume that safety is included in “life.” Our laws and policies can’t serve the cause of essential social freedom if they don’t provide life and liberty. Using Kant’s insight, a law that undermines life and liberty for some but not for others “destroys itself in practice.”
We’re building our list of morally grounded purposes:
Essential social freedom,
Life and liberty.
I have already clarified what I mean by freedom and liberty, but it bears repeating here. Freedom is personal, social, a promise to each person. Liberty is political; it is a promise to We the People, not to individuals but to all of us living as citizens in our Democratic Republic.
Our commitment to liberty means that rulers can’t conduct themselves as if they're above the law or impose their authority on individuals. In a liberal democracy, rulers rule through the power given to them in the Constitution and are affirmed or replaced through elections. Rulers (in America’s case, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government) must exercise their authority in a way that preserves the Constitution and the liberty of everyone who lives in our country. We exercise our freedom independent of the law. The law protects our political liberty and our social freedom.
Next, we can strengthen our morally grounded purposes by adopting an axiom that’s ubiquitous in the Eastern Intellectual Tradition: One’s happiness can’t cause pain in others. That's a nifty commitment to universal moral reasoning. What else?
As a nation we haven’t been so clear regarding peace. We haven’t adequately linked peace with justice. That’s just weird. The Declaration of Independence cited the violation of justice as grounds for the people to declare their ruler a tyrant who is unfit to rule and for their right to overthrow him, even to take up arms against him. In brief: No Justice, No Peace! It's right there in the Declaration of Independence. And yet our government and institutional leaders haven’t hesitated to use violence to suppress activists who have used peaceful demonstrations to demand their Constitutional rights. We must include peace and justice among our morally grounded purposes.
The pursuit of happiness has been largely ignored as a public responsibility and treated as a private matter, a personal responsibility. The pursuit of happiness is not a new claim. Jefferson put it in the Declaration of Independence. Our Founding Fathers risked their lives when they signed off on the document that includes it. It deserves a lot more intellectual attention in the public square so that we understand which areas of happiness and fulfillment are best thought of as personal and which are impossible to pursue alone, can only be achieved with the support of our community. We may not know what to do about the pursuit of happiness, but we know that it must be included in the morally grounded purposes of our liberal democracy. It's a goal, not an achievement. We give this topic more attention in the episodes that deal with Social Justice.
We might also acknowledge that public policy must deal with the just distribution of wealth. But as communist countries have taught us, the distribution of wealth is not an interesting topic if there is no wealth. Our economic system must both generate wealth and distribute wealth. Economic justice is better understood as a set of economic laws and policies that either help or frustrate our attempts to achieve our morally grounded purposes.
Interestingly, we have developed another insight. Our morally grounded purposes stand alone. They provide the standards by which we evaluate what is in society and the laws, policies and programs we adopt to achieve those purposes. Economic justice is a goal of our economic system and must be accounted for in our theory of economics.
The areas of our lives that require laws and policies can be described as areas of public responsibility, not morally grounded purposes. The just distribution of wealth is achieved through laws, policies, and programs that are evaluated in terms of their ability to achieve our morally grounded purposes.
What morally grounded purposes do we have so far?
Preserve and protect essential social freedom.
Provide for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
Guarantee justice and peace.
Make no laws that give happiness or benefit to some at the cost of doing harm to others.
That list looks pretty good, but it lacks clarity on one essential issue we studied in moral development. Universal moral reasoning treats everyone the same. Our moral statements must apply to all, equally. Just like it says in the Declaration of Independence (“All men are created equal”) and the Pledge of Allegiance (“With liberty and justice for all”). And as we have seen, to treat everyone equally, we must acknowledge and protect the full humanity of all of our people: All races, all religions, all genders, all sexual orientations. We acknowledge that full humanity includes the domains of the individual, person, and self. Now we’re getting at our morally grounded purposes, our core American values.
Recognize, preserve, and promote the dignity and worth of all humans.
Preserve and protect essential social freedom of all humans.
Provide for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness for all humans.
Guarantee peace and safety for all humans.
Make no laws that give happiness or benefit to some at the cost of doing harm to any other humans.
In We Hold These Truths, John Courtney Murray, S.J. insisted that agreement does not end argument but that useful argument begins with agreement. This truth applies to how we work to achieve our morally grounded purposes. Yes, we must agree about what we’re trying to accomplish, our morally grounded purposes. And when we have agreed, we treat them as axioms: Unquestioned core values that stand on their own, that everyone agrees to, that guide inquiry, practice, and most of all arguments in the public square.
Obviously, because the teloi or morally grounded purposes of a teleological argument or teleological reasoning play a defining role in the argument, in the reasoning that supports the argument, they must be unarguably true. They must be accepted by everyone participating in the argument. A false telos produces a fallacious argument. Unaccepted teloi produces the kind of disagreement that makes productive argument impossible.
I have not made arguments for our morally grounded purposes. I did not have to. First, I took them from our founding documents and added one that's ubiquitous in eastern philosophy and another that is a sine qua non to the others. They both seem indispensable in this discussion. Further, any arguments against them would employ tribal moral reasoning that has no place in the public square. Second, once we committed to mature moral reasoning, our morally grounded purposes became self-evident, as Jefferson said they were. One might be able to “just disagree” but as we have seen, that's fine in private life but childish conduct in the public square.
One must present a rational argument to support one’s rejection of any of our morally grounded purposes, and to do so one must advance the philosophy of a different form of government than ours or one grounded in tribal moral reasoning.
On the other hand, it is quite possible that we could add new morally grounded purposes to our list, like to protect the earth and our environment. But to do so would require our developing whole arguments to defend them which would be easy, but is not the job of this blog, well, not yet. This blog is designed to help We the People conduct all public arguments productively, not to carry them out. These morally grounded purposes suffice for now, and are unarguable, but they may not be exhaustive. There may be more.
Once we agree on our morally grounded purposes, there is enormous room for argument about how to achieve them. The important point to remember is that it's impossible even to begin rational discourse on what we ought to do in society, if we haven’t agreed on what we ought to achieve. This list of morally grounded purposes provides a solid foundation upon which to conduct moral discourse in the social sciences and in the public square. It supports the full development of the social sciences, our body politic, and our political mind.
With all this very practical work in epistemology, look what we have done. We have developed a system of universal public moral reasoning. We have both its structure and its essential content. A whole bunch of intellectuals in universities, journalism, and politics did not see that coming. Well don’t fight it. Improve on it or replace it with something better, but there is no denying that a system of universal public moral reasoning is indispensable to healing our fractured body politic and conducting rational discourse in the public square. It is indispensable to full intellectual development.
Checking back in on what we have done and what we must do, we recall that we're working on how we think about how we think. Epistemology consists of the source, organization, structure, and standards of knowledge in a discipline. Aristotle helped us think about our structure and standards. But what is our source? This is where mathematics helps us think
The Source of Knowledge in Moral Philosophy
It's helpful to think of moral philosophy as similar to mathematics and social science as similar to natural science. Mathematics and natural science are indispensable to each other, and develop knowledge differently. Moral philosophy and social science are indispensable to each other, and develop knowledge differently.
When mathematicians develop knowledge, they identify mathematical axioms and conduct rational arguments based on the best mathematical knowledge and deductive reason. What is their source of knowledge? In a nut shell: The mathematics community, working together with shared rules is the source of knowledge in mathematics. However, as we will see when we discuss the Enlightenment, mathematics was not able to reach full development on its own. Only when mathematics became indispensable to science, only when mathematics was forced to solve problems within the scientific method, did it begin to reach full development.
Moral philosophy has a lot in common with mathematics. Working together, moral philosophers correct and contribute to each other when they operate with mature cognitive development and mature moral reasoning. The moral philosophy community working together with shared rules of logic is the source of knowledge in moral philosophy.
However, the work of moral philosophers can’t reach full development unless it becomes indispensable to social science. And to become indispensable to social science, it must engage and confront and solve moral questions for the social sciences. The source of knowledge in moral philosophy is the moral philosophy community. The tests or standards of knowledge in moral philosophy occur in the social sciences which confirms or rejects the capacity of the assertions of moral philosophy to aid the full development of the social sciences.
Our work on epistemology in moral philosophy has produced our source of knowledge, the moral philosophy community. It has also provided our structure of moral reasoning, Aristotle’s teleological structure of goals, virtues and vices; and standards of knowledge, our morally grounded purposes. But these standards only become real when operating in the social sciences. And we can’t even think about the organization of knowledge in moral philosophy because that organization occurs in the organization of knowledge in the social sciences. That discussion takes place entirely within our discussion of social science.
Is there a moral philosophy method? Yes, but it's like the mathematical method, not the scientific method. The mathematical method establishes mathematical axioms and uses strict rules of logic. Its proofs are largely mathematical. Its applications occur in science. Moral philosophy must establish morally grounded purposes and moral axioms, but ultimately, the truth, the standards used to evaluate moral philosophy’s conclusions, must be established in society by the social sciences acting within the public square and government.
As we will see, everything we think about how we think in moral philosophy, our entire epistemology of moral philosophy, makes more sense when combined with social science. So let’s get to that conversation.
Social Science Method and Epistemology:
There was something to be said for treating the social sciences as branches of moral philosophy. They're that connected. But the social science method goes way beyond what moral philosophy is capable of. It really is an advancement in thinking and learning to treat them as interdependent but different. From an epistemological point of view, they make little sense except as integrated fields of study: Moral philosophy provides answers to the question What ought to be? And the social sciences use What Ought to Be in so many ways that a list is helpful. The social sciences learn what ought to be from moral philosophy and use it:
As the criteria for evaluating What Is in society.
To decide what to change and what to keep in society.
To develop new laws, policies, and programs to aid society.
To evaluate those laws, policies, and programs.
We need to look more closely at social science.
Emile Durkheim (1858 to 1917) taught social scientists to study objects in society and to use the scientific method in that study, but the social sciences must do more than just use the scientific method when testing results. They aren’t just interested in being able to describe what is happening or predict what will happen, they must prove that what will happen when public laws, policies, and programs are implemented will be what ought to happen.
The social science method must commit to achieving both predictability and morality. Social scientists must strive to say with an acceptable level of confidence that if we do A we will get B and B is good. That gets us close to the social science method. Social scientists have developed the statistical methods that measure predictability. Now we turn to the social science epistemology. Again, an Epistemology tells us the source, organization, structure, and standards of knowledge in a discipline.
The Source of Knowledge in Social Science:
The most obvious source of knowledge in social science is society. That’s what the social sciences study. That’s what defines social science as a science: It studies what is. The fact that it studies what is in society defines it as a social science. But the social sciences must also study what ought to be. That’s what defines social science as social science, not natural science. So the social sciences have two sources of knowledge: What Is in Society and What Ought to Be in Society, or the morally grounded purposes of our society as established by moral philosophy. At the source of knowledge level, social science integrates science and moral philosophy. We will come back to that.
The Structure and Standards of Knowledge in Social Science:
Social science has both moral structure/standards and scientific structure/standards. Social science must structure the study of what is in the context of what ought to be. Social science must evaluate what is in society against what ought to be. Studying what is against what ought to be is one of the structures of social science and studying what ought to be is one of the standards. Using that structure and those standards, social science acts with moral philosophy.
(When I read this chapter, it feels like I am stating the obvious, being redundant. It's obvious now, but it took a ton of work to get here.)
But social science is also science. Social science constructs best guesses about what ought to be done to make society better and translates those suppositions into mathematically structured hypotheses.
That’s exactly what scientists do and it's exactly what social scientists do: They design mathematically structured hypotheses, experiments that accommodate the collection of data in a form that can be subjected to mathematical analysis, with the standard of a prescribed level of predictability. Social science uses the structure and standards inherent in the scientific method. That’s the scientific structure and the scientific standards in the social science method. But in the design of its research, the social sciences must also design research that pays attention to what they're trying to predict: That it works and is good. All social science research, in sociology and management and economics and education, all of it can be vastly improved, made more useful, by focusing on both mathematical predictability and morality.
When social scientists design their experiments, design what data they collect and how they analyze it, they must account for both predictability and morality. Predictability is required in science. Morality is required because the social sciences are useless if they can’t help us achieve what ought to be. Again, the epistemology of social science integrates social science with moral philosophy. It integrates the structure and standards of science and moral philosophy. In a nut shell: scientific/mathematical predictability and morality.
As we will see when we investigate Feuerstein in episodes on Education Justice, we’re talking about changing how social scientists think and what they do. We’re not talking about behavior modification, although behavior does change. We’re talking about structural cognitive modification, changing the structure of how social scientists think. How they design research is, of course, what they do, but to fix how they do it, they must change how they think about it. Cognitive modification. Then they can help We the People change how we think, modify our cognition, so that we can change how we behave, how we talk in the public square.
The Organization of Knowledge in Social Science:
We have talked about the source, method, structure, and standards of knowledge in social science. What about organization? This is where Thomas Kuhn is useful, and when combined with Piaget, is a game changer. Kuhn helps us expand our understanding of formal operations; he describes paradigms, the organization of knowledge that unites both knowledge in a discipline and the members that make up the discipline's community.
As we have seen, formal reasoning consists of syllogisms, formal conceptual frameworks, and theoretical models and paradigms. However, the development of paradigms has the greatest impact on how social scientists think and what they do, what unites them as a community. In our discussion of Education Justice we will discuss paradigms, their power and structure and impact on disciplines that have one. It's not enough to talk about paradigms. We must see how one works and its impact on a discipline that gets one.
Natural Science, Social Science, and Moral Philosophy:
We have seen that moral philosophy and social science cannot reach full development without each other. They're useless without each other. But what about natural science? How does it relate to moral philosophy and social science? In an important way, it does not. Natural science reaches its full development when it does what it does free of interference from moral philosophy and social science. But that does not mean that natural science does not have a role to play in the public square.
A vast percentage of the research in natural science is morally neutral. It has no need for moral philosophy. However, some scientific research begs social solutions. And we must listen to what scientists tell us when they come to the public square and say:
Hey, we found this out, and We the People (yes, scientists too are members of the body politic when they enter the public square) must do something about it.
But scientists have no way of studying what We the People “ought” to do to fix a social problem. They can discover problems that impact society by using scientific research, but they can’t fix problems that require social solutions. All scientists can do is tell We the People what the problem is and give some technical advice on how to fix it. But We the People must decide what we will do to fix social problems.
Now that scientists have proven scientifically that global climate change threatens all life on earth, both natural scientists and the rest of us must ask, What should we do? Natural science is not capable of answering an “ought” question. Immediately, social science and moral philosophy enter the scene. Social science and moral philosophy have roles to play and must play them well as our body politic, as We the People, respond to what natural science tells us about global climate change.
Natural science has given us unarguable scientific facts. These facts are unarguable using scientific reasoning. Of course, anyone stuck on stupid, stupidly committed to ignorance, can argue with them. But as we have seen, they cannot participate in arguments being conducted in the public square because they cannot participate in rational arguments. One cannot rationally participate in scientific arguments, accept or reject scientific evidence, unless one uses scientific knowledge and methods of reasoning. We the People must decide what we ought to do and how to do it. But we can’t deny the facts. We the People can’t ignore the truth of natural science regarding global climate change, and We the People must decide what to do about it.
Similarly, natural science is capable of developing artificial intelligence that rivals a kind of human intelligence. How should it be developed? How should it be allowed to impact society? How should it be restrained? What must We the People insist the government do to accommodate AI and continue to achieve our Morally Grounded Purposes. AI did not replace our Morally Grounded Purposes and must not be allowed to vitiate them. Again, natural science can’t answer those questions. Social science and moral philosophy have central roles to play and they must play them well. Indeed, what social science and moral philosophy bring to the challenges presented by AI are at least arguably more crucial to the fate of humanity than what natural science brings.
It's no small matter that today social science and moral philosophy play minor roles in the university compared to natural science and that all three have virtually no voice in the public square. Part of the problem is that moral philosophers and social scientists have been silent in the public square. They have abandoned their role of establishing intellectual leadership and moral certitude in the public square. They have left a vacuum that radical capitalists and Status Christians have filled with doctrines felt as facts.
We will see later that when Aquinas made the West safe for reason, he allowed reason to trump religion in the public square. That success was evident when Rome could not stop the Copernican Revolution and during other public battles waged between religion and reason over the centuries. But right now, reason is taking a back seat to radical capitalists supported by Status Christians. Social scientists and moral philosophers face enormous intellectual and political challenges to set things straight in the public square. They cannot do it alone. We the People must work with them. But first, we all must show up.
We need:
A critical mass of Americans to show up in the public square and support our arguments. Religious humanists who believe that social responsibility is a prerequisite to redemption. Secular humanists who believe that a good life requires that they help others. Americans who believe that they're members of and responsible for our community and our liberal democracy.
This entire blog is based on my book Let's Get Civil: Healing Our Fractured Body Politic. Some viewers may want to read it. You can order it from Amazon. be sure to use my full name: Patrick Conroy.
Website: Intellectual Leadership in the Public Square.
Email: Patrickconroy61@gmail.com.